

Transformation of the Views of China on the Problem of Supply Chain Management of Territorial Regulation of the Borders of India in the Last Quarter of the XX Century

Vlada Vadimovna Paramonova¹, Rustem Ravilevich Muhametzyanov¹, Vitaly Anatolievich Epshteyn²

¹Kazan Federal University

²Institute of Business Studies (IBS-Moscow), International Relations department

Russian presidential academy of national economy and public administration, (RANEPA, Moscow)

¹vvladaparamonova@gmail.com

²epshteinv@gmail.com

Abstract— After the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, the PRC opens a new page in its foreign policy history. This is mostly due to the reforms and transformations that Deng Xiaoping proclaimed. The change of sociopolitical and economic structures that had taken place laid the foundation for China's entry into world leaders in some positions. By the time Deng Xiaoping came to power, the Chinese economy was in decline after the "political adventures" of Mao Zedong. To get out of this situation, it was necessary to liberalize the economic and social sectors, as well as solve a whole range of foreign policy problems (from establishing official diplomatic relations with the USA and improving relations with the USSR, to solving the problems of Hong Kong and Macao) in order to become a harmonious part of the world community. To strengthen its position in the Asia-Pacific region, China needed, first of all, to establish relations with all its neighbours and resolve territorial disputes, of which there were many. This article is supposed to consider the question of the attempts of the PRC to resolve existing differences on the disputed parts of the borders with the Republic of India. In the period under review, China had several territorial disputes with its neighbours, which did not allow to realize the foreign policy potential, and there was also not a sufficient number of allies and economic partners of the PRC. As an example of a solution to border disputes, one can cite a positive result achieved in the course of negotiations with the USSR on the demarcation of the border. If China managed to achieve its goals with its northern neighbor, the question with India still remains open.

In our study, an attempt will be made to analyse the course of the negotiation process between the PRC and the Republic of India in the last quarter of the 20th century and to identify the reasons for the lack of a decision on this issue. This analysis is interesting not only in terms of forecasting the development of

the situation in the APR but also within the framework of other territorial problems of the PRC.

Keywords— China, Republic of India, Foreign Policy, War, Supply chain strategy, Cold War, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong, Indira Gandhi, Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh, Dalai Lama.

1. Introduction

The origins of the Sino-Indian border conflict began in the period when British India was ruled by the British Crown, which marked the boundaries between the two current states. After gaining independence by the Republic of India in 1947 and the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the countries began to establish relations with their neighbors [1]. It soon became apparent that both countries did not have the same idea of where and how the border should pass. All attempts to resolve territorial disputes were unsuccessful.

By the mid-1950s, the situation began to worsen, China switched to active operations in the Tibetan region: the Chinese introduced military personnel of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) into the region, launched the construction of strategic highways, airfields, new control points, as well as issuing maps, in which the disputed territories were included in the PRC [2, 3,4].

The consequence of this was several diplomatic statements from India. In response, in 1959, Zhou Enlai sent a letter to the Indian Prime Minister, in which he officially declared that the border between India and China was never designated formally and secured by an agreement signed by the leaders of the two countries, which means China refused to recognize the borderline McMahon [3].

In August 1959, parts of the PLA fired upon the Indian border checkpoint in the Longju area. In October, Indian positions were fired on the territory of the Kongka Pass in the west of the border, which resulted in the death of nine Indian soldiers.

According to many Indian political figures of that time, it was precisely these clashes that became key moments in shaping the negative attitude of India to China [4]. In 1961, armed conflicts became frequent between the armed border forces of both countries, which in October 1962 escalated into full-scale hostilities. The active phase of the so-called "border war" lasted 31 days and ended in the defeat of India [5].

Referring to the Indian data, it can be argued that in the period from June 1955 to July 1962, about 30 clashes occurred. As a result, China has occupied about 15 thousand square meters. Miles of the territory [5]. The Indian Parliament adopted a resolution on the liberation of the territories seized by China, which is still valid today.

The world community closely followed the developments in the region and condemned the aggressive actions of the PRC. China did not receive official support from any state, the USSR also did not support its ally, calling for a cease-fire. Despite the reaction of foreign countries, border armed clashes on borders continued in the future.

Since 1962, the situation in the region has become aggravated by the fact of the convergence of the PRC and Pakistan. Closer relations were established between the countries, and final agreements were reached on the common border of the Chinese Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The coalition of China and Pakistan was beneficial to the parties not only in the light of the aggravated relations with India but also the general situation in South Asia.

The situation began to change only from 1976 when significant internal political changes took place in the PRC and India. The death of Mao Zedong and the collapse of the "gang of four" in China and the coming to power in India of the association "Bharatiya Janata Party" (Bharatiya Janata Party) gave hope for resolving the situation at the border. But if for the new leadership of India, the foreign policy doctrine remained unchanged, then the policy of the PRC began to change with the coming to power of Deng Xiaoping [6].

2. Methods

In the course of the study, problem-chronological and historical-comparative methods were used, which made it possible to chronologically and reliably present the facts of the negotiation process between the PRC and the Republic of India. An analytical method was also used, which allowed understanding the causes of events. The method of studying the process allowed us to identify key areas of the negotiation process and analyze the solutions achieved.

3. Results and Discussion

Despite the changes that began in the two countries before the 1980s, the negotiation process between China and India did not have positive trends, although the parties tried to establish a dialogue. With the return of Indira Gandhi to power in India in January 1980, the policy of establishing peace with China was proclaimed. Already in April, Indira Gandhi met with the Second Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, Hua Guofeng, and the Second Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Huang Hua. They once again confirmed the position of each of the parties. China set about stabilizing relations to bypass the conflict, India did not intend to abandon its principles in resolving territorial issues, but both sides realized the need to determine the border issue.

In June 1981, Huang Hua visited Delhi [7]. During the meeting, it was possible to get the issue off the ground. India went to the negotiations even though Beijing did not vacate the occupied disputed territories, which had previously been the primary condition for the start of negotiations. The meeting discussed possible methods for resolving the conflict. China refused to consider the disputed parts of the border along the line of the "complex deal," which meant the removal of contradictions that could cast doubt on the prospects of further negotiations. Also, Delhi softened its position by proposing closer economic and social relations between the countries. Thus, at the meeting, the main agreements were reached to continue the negotiation process, as well as the prospect of cooperation between the countries. In fact, these were the first significant shifts in the negotiation process.

In October 1982, Indira Gandhi met with Premier of the PRC State Council Zhao Ziyang, at which the positive results of previous negotiations were consolidated, and Indira Gandhi was invited to visit Beijing on an official visit. It should be noted that, despite the protracted nature of the negotiation process, there were still positive developments. Both China and India softened their positions to reach a final agreement by supply chain management.

Unfortunately, the negotiations that took place in 1983 were not so successful. The main stumbling block was the question of the procedure for considering disputed parts of the border. India preferred a sectoral consideration of a controversial issue, while the Chinese side returned to a comprehensive solution to the territorial problem, examining all three sections of the border simultaneously, based on the principle of a single watershed [8]. Although this round of negotiations did not bring fundamental changes in the solution

of the border issue, however, the participants were able to agree on the non-use of military force.

During the subsequent round of talks held in 1984 in Beijing, a warming relationship between the parties was noted. It was decided to consider the controversial parts of the borders sectoral [9-15]. Besides, the Indian government was ready to make some compromises, but this was not to be: the tragic death of Indira Gandhi stopped the negotiations for a long time.

The newly elected Indian government, headed by Rajiv Gandhi, in December 1984, announced its desire to streamline and normalize relations with all neighbouring countries, including China. Already in November 1985, finally, the next round of negotiations on the border issue took place, which was to be a turning point, since the parties had to proceed to discuss key issues. However, the consensus was not reached: China still recognized the McMahon line as a ceasefire line, not the official borderline, and also did not recognize Sikkim part of India [10, 16- 24].

The negotiations of 1986-1987 did not bring positive changes. This was connected not only with the regular armed incidents on the disputed parts of the border, which were regarded as a violation of the agreements reached earlier but also by the harsh statements made by representatives of the PRC government on the border issue [11, 25, 26]. However, further escalation of the tension did not occur, mainly because the PRC government would have difficulty in justifying the next military clashes on the disputed parts of the border.

Held in 1987-1988 The meetings of representatives of the PRC and India showed that both parties are incredibly interested in getting out of the current impasse. Negotiations were generally held in a friendly atmosphere. According to the political leaders of India and China, relations between the countries needed restructuring and renewal; the parties had to refrain from any violent actions in the border areas, as well as to find ways to establish peaceful and friendly relations, avoiding past misunderstandings.

Of course, this whole reset was not only because India and China realized that they were at a dead end in the negotiations. The situation in the world changed; the Cold War ended, the world ceased to be bipolar.

Another factor was that during this time, China and India had changed significantly. Having improved the economic situation, each country began to act independently, recognizing itself as an important political and economic strength of the region. Also, there was an understanding that the solution of a disputed border issue can contribute not only to the growth of mutually beneficial cooperation but also to the stability and prosperity of the entire region. China understood that the acquired status of nuclear power must be taken into account.

In December 1988, during Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the PRC, the prospects for peaceful cooperation between the two countries were discussed. The Chinese side was extremely optimistic about India's recognition of Tibet as part of China, as well as the readiness of the Indian government to express its full support for its Chinese counterparts in the fight against Tibetan anti-government speeches and in resolving the Tibet issue [12].

Based on the agreements reached earlier, in July 1989, a meeting of Indian and Chinese expert groups was held to discuss the conflict. India was represented by Secretary of Foreign Affairs SK Singh, while Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing headed the Chinese delegation. The primary purpose of the gathering was to search for a path of peaceful settlement, reduce the concentration of military units, as well as establish peace and order in the Himalayan region [13, 25].

In the same 1989, a representative of the PRC, Deputy Prime Minister of the PRC, U Xuetsyan, visited India. Similar to the last meeting, the main goal of the talks was to achieve peace and order in the border zone. The Chinese country stressed that India is a leader in South Asia and is the guarantor of peace and security. Indian Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao noted that the resolution of the border conflict is possible only after the elections in India in 1990 [14].

The government of the national front, which came to power after the elections, headed by SK Singh reaffirmed the course towards improving and strengthening relations with the PRC, especially economic and scientific-technical ones, as well as interaction in the international arena represented by various economic and political organizations. In March 1990, during the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Qian Qichen, to India, agreements were reached on the bilateral development of relations in the sphere of economy, science, and culture [15, 21-23]. At these meetings, the border issue was also discussed. The result of the negotiations was the process of reducing the military contingent on both sides of the border, which began in 1991 [16]. Also, the exchange of military delegations of the two countries started from this period: meetings of defense ministers, chiefs of general staffs of armies, students of various military academies.

Regular contacts of representatives of the two countries contributed to the further normalization of relations and the growth of economic cooperation. Successes in the negotiation process were consolidated in September 1993 during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Narishimha Rao to China.

During this meeting, the leaders of the countries signed the "Agreement on maintaining peace and tranquility along the line of actual control" (September 7, 1993). This meant that the parties

agreed to support specific confidence-building measures, the conflict must, of course, be resolved solely through “peaceful and friendly consultations.” The agreement provided for the reduction of the military contingents of both countries in the border area to the lowest possible level, and a mechanism was developed to resolve sudden conflicts. Also, according to the Agreement, an expert group was created from representatives of law enforcement, political and diplomatic countries of both countries to clarify the line of actual control and specify confidence and security measures.

hus, the principle of mutual security was recognized as a priority in solving the current situation. Also, this Agreement was one of the first to be signed by two Asian powers that took control of armaments.

4. Summary

Of course, the stabilization of the situation between India and China was of great importance for the world as a whole in the supply chain.

The agreements between India and China reached in the 1990s were important for the further development of bilateral relations. At the same time, it should be noted that in 1974 and 1998 the Republic of India conducted a series of tests of nuclear weapons. These events led India to the category of countries with unofficial nuclear capabilities. On the one hand, this increased the security level of the Republic of India, and on the other hand, it complicated the geopolitical situation. This became an argument for finding peaceful ways to resolve territorial disputes between India and China. Positive developments in the negotiation process had a positive impact on the development of the entire region. But at the same time, it should be noted that officially the border between the countries has not been defined yet.

5. Conclusions

It should be noted that in the second half of the 20th century, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India passed a tremendous path of development. The PRC emerged from the most profound economic and social trap in which it found itself after many years of wars of the first half of the 20th century and adventurous companies, in the second half and even in the last quarter of the 20th century. The same can be said about India, which, after a long colonial period, gained independence, and at the same time, the opportunity to develop independently politically and economically.

The problem left by the PRC and India from the colonial period remains unresolved until now. However, the two powers coexist peacefully,

having a strong and productive economic partnership, in 2017 the level of trade between the countries reached 84.4 billion dollars and continues to increase [16-20].

The long history of the territorial dispute is explained not only by the desire of the two countries to resolve the conflict in their favor but also by the internal political and foreign policy events that occurred during this period. This includes the Sino-Vietnamese war, and close cooperation between China and Pakistan, the recognition by India of the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the killing of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi. But the global changes in the world, which began after the end of the Cold War, contributed to the fact that the two powers began to address the issue of disputed territories. Although at the moment the border goes along the line of actual control, the negotiation process between the two countries continues.

Acknowledgements

The work is performed according to the Russian Government Program of Competitive Growth of Kazan Federal University.

References

- [1] Marat Z. Galiullin, Victor E. Tumanin, Yakov Y. Grishin and Valeryi A. Letyaev Federative system of India in the era of postcolonial modernization of the country // *Man in India* - No. 97, Issue No. : 8 (2017)- pp. 267-274
- [2] Grover B.S Sikkim and India// *Storm and consolidation/ Grover B.S. – New Delhi, 1970. - 3-4 c.*
- [3] Henry McMahon International Boundaries // *Source: Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, Vol. 84, No. 4330 (NOVEMBER 15th, 1935), P. 2-16*
- [4] *Contemporary India with Controversial Neighbours/ Rajkumar Singh - New Delhi, 2011, - P 196.*
- [5] *India-China Relations, 1947-1971: Friendship Goes with Power/ Shri Ram Sharma - New Delhi, 1999. - Part 1. - P 112.*
- [6] *The Times of India// The Times of India. – 1979.- 22 February. – P.6.*
- [7] *Kumar Mahendra India and China today / Kumar Mahendra// Delhi. – 1981. – 27-30 июня. – P.1.*
- [8] *The Hindu. – Chennai. – 1983. – 31 October.*
- [9] *The Times of India. – New Dehli. – 1984. – 23-24 September.*
- [10] *The Times of India. – New Dehli – 1985 - 5-12 November*
- [11] *The Hindustan Times.-New Dehli.-1986. – 17 June*

- [12] Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China [Электронный ресурс]// http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/
- [13] The Times of India. – New Dehli. – 1989. – 2 July
- [14] The Times of India. – New Dehli. – 1989. 13 October
- [15] The Times of India. – New Dehli. – 1990 -23-26 March
- [16] The Times of India. – New Dehli. – 1990. - 1 February
- [17] Sazesh, A., & Siadat, S. A. (2018). The Relationship between Quantum Management and Organizational Agility in Ministry of Roads and Urban Development of Golestan Province, Iran. *Dutch Journal of Finance and Management*, 2(2), 51. <https://doi.org/10.29333/djfm/5827>
- [18] Abramova, V., Pires, F., & Bernardino, J. (2016). Open Source and Proprietary Project Management Tools for SMEs. *Journal of Information Systems Engineering & Management*, 1(3), 177-186. <https://doi.org/10.20897/lectito.201633>
- [19] Karimi Zarchi, S., Dehestani, M. A., & Farimani, A. (2016). The relationship between the proportion of long-term debt to total assets and economic value throughout the life of the company. *UCT Journal of Management and Accounting Studies*, 4(2), 16-21.
- [20] Tejada, S., & Dominguez, A. (2019). Influence of Interactions in the Collaborative Solving of a Velocity Problem. *International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education*, 14(1), 91-108. <https://doi.org/10.12973/iejme/3979>
- [21] Malik, H. I., Ismail, M. Y., Adnan, S., Masrol, S. R., & Nafarizal, N. (2019). A wideband reflectarray antenna based on organic substrate materials. *Telkomnika*, 17(1).
- [22] Odebia A, Oyekala J. Evaluation of Cost-benefit Disparity of Butter Production in Nigeria. *Journal of Humanities Insights*. 2018;02(03):109-13.
- [23] Zikai T. An Overview of Economical Corruption in USA and Analysis of its Future. *Journal of Humanities Insights*. 2018;02(01):43-50.
- [24] Mse G. The Changes of Educational Planning in Kenya Educational System since Independence. *Journal of Humanities Insights*. 2017;01(02):94-8.
- [25] Salah M, Jonbu S. Investigation of Verpamil Effect as Adjuvant Anaesthetic Drug *Medbiotech Journal*. 2017;01(01):42-7.
- [26] Z. Man AGE, S. M. Mostafavi,, Surendar A. Fuel oil characteristics and applications: economic and technological aspects. *Petroleum Science and Technology*. 2019.