Application of Supply Chain Finance in Indonesian Banking Sector for Anti-Money Laundering

Atqkan Sjukri Karim[1], Nafsiah Mohamed[2], Muhammad Azmi Niaz Ahamd[3], Hendi Yogi Prabowo[4]

[1]*Institut Digital Bisnis Indonesia*
[2]*Accounting Research Institute of University Teknologi MARA*
[3]*University Teknologi MARA*
[4]*Universitas Islam Indonesia*
(atqkan@yahoo.com[1], nafsiah793@uitm.edu.my[2]
mohdazminias@uitm.edu.my[3], hendi_prabowo@yahoo.com[4])

***Abstract*- One good way to adopt a fresh perspective is by looking at how leading consumer business (CB) organizations efficiently move goods through their supply chains. Money laundering is the process by which large amount of illegally obtained money from drug trafficking, terrorist activity or other serious crimes, is given the appearance of having originated from the legitimate source. Money laundering is a risk faced by all banks because money laundering often use banking sector facilities to move, exchange or disguise illegal funds. This study aims to identify the effect of finacail supply chain on money laundering intention in the Indonesian banking sector. The design of this study used combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative methods are carried out by surveys and in-depth interviews on qualitative methods. The results of this study indicate that financial supply chain system have a positive effect on money laundering intentions.**

Keywords: *Supply chain finance, Bank system, Economic growth, Money Laundering*

1. Introduction

Retail banks operate some of the largest, most complex and most secure supply chains in the world, transporting and storing cash across thousands of locations every day. The cost of operating these supply chains extends to spending on all the equipment and services required to process and distribute cash throughout the bank's network– from the central bank through to branches/ATMs and ultimately to customers. These costs are high and growing due to two main drivers: the rising demand for cash and the increasing use of more complex technology across the supply chain [19]. Money laundering is the process of taking the results generated by criminal activities and providing these results as legality. Money laundering not only allows the perpetrators to move their money to the community freely, but also prevents funds from being confiscated by the judicial authorities. The IMF estimates that the amount of money laundered globally in one year is between 2 and 5 percent of global GDP, or around US $ 1-2 trillion per year [21].

Money laundering is a form of crime, justified by the fact that money launderers are looking for ways to legitimize illegal profits obtained through illegal activities and allow perpetrators to enjoy the proceeds of their crimes [5]. By looking at the modus operandi of money laundering, banking institutions are the first level of contact point for money laundering actors because of several factors including some services provided by banking institutions such as deposits, loans, investments and foreign exchange. In the formation of banking institutions, the risk assessment of money laundering is largely focused on the role of organization-based, for example money laundering policies and compliance with supervisory requirements [20; 23].

In Indonesia, money laundering cases are also rife. In 2016, the former General Treasurer of the Democratic Party, Muhammad Nazaruddin, was demanded 7 years in prison for money laundering. Nazaruddin used political power as a tool for acts of corruption, so that it was categorized as grand corruption. In addition, Nazaruddin was legally proven to have laundered money amounting to Rp. 580 billion. The money came from the gratuity of PT Duta Graha Indonesia (DGI) of Rp. 23.1 billion and gratuities of PT Nindya Karya of Rp. 17.25 billion. The illegal money laundering was carried out by transferring assets from October 2010 to December 15, 2014 with a value of Rp. 500 billion. Nazaruddin also disguised his assets of Rp. 80 billion from 15 September 2009 to 22 October 2010.

Money laundering does not directly harm certain people or organizations, even at first glance there appear to be no victims [6]. Money laundering results in two types of indirect damage, namely social and economic damage [18]. Social damage refers to the loss of civil liberties, especially privacy. This is because the provisions of anti money laundering pose a threat to individual privacy. Meanwhile, economic damage refers to an increase in economic transaction costs and implementation costs that reduce the country's wealth. As a result, the market loses competitiveness due to a bad reputation [16].

Money laundering is not the same as robbery, theft, or murder that has a direct victim, and causes harm to the victim. However, actually money laundering has various negative impacts. These negative impacts can occur in the economic sector, the real sector, productivity, international trade, and capital flows [9]. Ba & Huynh (2018) [4] revealed that money laundering can damage the financial system and reduce foreign investment. In addition, money laundering can also encourage crime. This is in the form of fraud, sales of psychotropic substances, unfair competition, even bankruptcy of companies [9].

An increase in the crime of money laundering by utilizing the financial system to hide or obscure the origin of the proceeds of crime will have a negative impact on people's lives, even threatening the economic stability of a

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country [18]. In the economic field, money laundering can harm the private sector because money laundering is usually carried out with the services of a company (front company) to hide the proceeds of crime. The next impact is an increase in financial crimes and high social costs, especially the costs of increasing efforts to overcome, prevent and enforce the law [17].

Money laundering is based on pressure and opportunity [22]. Pressures can be categorized into four groups, namely financial pressures, pressures on bad habits, and pressures related to work [10]. Financial pressures that are often resolved by cheating can be caused by several factors, namely greed and too high a standard of living. Money laundering is carried out because of financial pressures, namely greedy human nature [27].

E-money facilities digitally signed by an institution through a key Encryption will make it easier for money launderers to hide acts of crime committed. The world's largest money transfer company, Western Union, recently agreed to pay US$586 million to settle charges oin financial supply chain process that its anti-money laundering (AML) controls were inadequate, enabling millions of dollars of prohibited transactions to be completed.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Transparesy in Financial supply chain management

A whole industry has built up around them to advise on how to avoid risks, how to check every client, large or small and how to increase supply chain transparency. Money laundering is based on a variety of factors known as diamond fraud. Diamond fraud includes pressure, rationalization, opportunity and capability [22]. This research uses two aspects in the diamond faud namely pressure and opportunity. Money laundering is often based on financial pressures [27]. The opportunity factor is also one of the drivers of the action. Money laundering is based on diamond fraud which includes pressure, rationalization, opportunity and capability [22]. Pressures can be categorized into four groups, namely financial pressures, pressures on bad habits, and pressures related to work [10]. Financial pressures that are often resolved by fraud can be caused by several factors, namely greed and too high a standard of living. Money laundering is carried out because of financial pressures, namely greedy human nature [27].

Fraud can be done if there is an opportunity to do so. F. M. Teichmann & Sergi (2018) [25] divides fraud opportunities into six factors, including lack of supervision to prevent or detect fraud, inability to assess the quality of performance, and lack of supervision of access to information. The e-money facility digitally signed by an institution through an encryption key will make it easier for money launderers to hide their actions.

2.2. Theory of Planned Behaviour

Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) originated from Theory of Reasoned Action in 1980 to predict the intentions of individuals involved in behavior at certain times and places [2]. The key component to this theory is intention and ability to control behavior. Theory of planned behavior reveals that a person's behavior is driven by intentions to behave [3]. The main factor in the theory of planned behavior is the intention of individuals to carry out certain behaviors. Intention is assumed to be a motivating factor that influences behavior and is an indication of how much effort is planned to be made. Someone who has a strong intention to take action, the greater the possibility of the intention is actualized in the form of action [2].

Theory of Planned Behavior is divided into three categories including attitudes, subjective norms, and behavioral control [3]. Attitude refers to the extent to which a person has an evaluation of actions that are beneficial or unprofitable. This can also be said as consideration of the results of an action. Love of money has the potential to encourage individuals to make unethical attitudes, including money laundering. Someone who has high pressure to do money laundering will also have high intention. In addition, every individual who prioritizes work in his life and has an organizational environment that supports crime, will do anything for profit. Subjective norms are a view of whether most people approve or disapprove the action. This category deals with beliefs about whether other people think that the individual should be involved in the action or refer to the perceived social pressure to do or not perform the behavior.

The third category is behavior control. Behavioral control refers to a person's perception of the ease or difficulty that will be encountered in carrying out an action. Everyone has the opportunity to carry out money laundering, but if the control system implemented by the bank is difficult, this will discourage the perpetrators. An organizational culture that supports money laundering and is driven by capability will increase money laundering intentions.

2.3. Money Laundering Risks in the Banking Sector with finance supply chain system

Money laundering is a risk faced by all banks [17]. This is because money launderers often use banking sector facilities to move, exchange or disguise illegal funds. Money laundering becomes a serious concern when criminals use the results of laundering through the banking system which resulted in an attack on September 11, 2001 in the United States [6]. Since 1970, laws passed by the US government have progressively increased the requirements for banks to develop anti-money laundering [18]. Over the past few years, money laundering has become a major focus area for risk assessment in the banking sector [17]. The banking sector is required to detect, monitor and report on potential money laundering and will receive significant penalties for not complying with these rules [19].

The banking sector cannot be separated from the inherent risks of money laundering and terrorism originating from financial institutions, geographical areas, products and services, and transactions [14]. Money laundering has a long history in the banking sector as a mechanism for transferring money [17]. Initially money laundering is done using simple cash deposits in bank branches and requires a long time. Along with the development of technology, methods have now developed with complex financial schemes designed to complicate the investigation process and hide the source of funds. The strategy is carried out through the merger of legitimate but hidden transactions and accounts [18].

The banking sector is expected to be able to implement appropriate systems and controls to reduce the risk of

money laundering [14]. Therefore, regulation is considered as a way to manage risks that cannot be avoided [24]. Anti-money laundering systems are also required to be risk based. Assessing risk in the banking sector is an important component of the risk management process as a result of innovations in the banking and financial industry. Money laundering risk management is also very important in efforts to prevent operational and reputational risks because money launderers can use various services provided by banks such as deposits, loans, investments and foreign exchange [25].

2.4. Typology of Money Laundering

Money laundering can be done with a very diverse modus operandi, from saving at a bank to buying a luxury home or shares. However, basically all of these modes can be classified into three types of typologies, which do not always occur gradually, but are even done simultaneously. Three phases of typology are placement, layering, and integration.

The first step is placement. Placement is an effort to add funds from illegal activities into the financial system. In this phase, illegal funds are entered into the financial system. The most obvious and high-risk crime outcomes are detected at this stage of placement. Converting illegal funds into cash deposits in bank accounts and using cash to buy high-value assets such as land, property, and luxury goods are examples of placement [7].

At the placement stage, money launderers tend to place their results in the financial system, the retail economy or smuggle them abroad. This is done by breaking up large amounts of cash into smaller amounts. The smaller amount of cash is then deposited in a bank account or used to buy other monetary instruments. Their aim is to issue cash from their origin to avoid detection by the authorities [17].

The second step after placement is layering. Layering is the second phase which involves financial transactions with the aim of deciding the trail of money laundering [7]. An example of the layering phase is the use of a series of complex transactions involving many banks, accounts or companies that aim to move, spread or disguise illegal funds to conceal the true origin of funds [16]. Layering can also be used to structure money laundering techniques by dividing large amounts of money into smaller deposits [7].

The integration phase is the final stage which involves the movement of phase 2 (layering) into the formal economy. Integration is usually done through the banking system, so illegal funds will look like income from normal business activities. Actors can invest funds owned in real estate, luxury assets, or legitimate business ventures [18]. At this stage, it is very difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal results. At this stage, actors combine funds that have gone through the process of money laundering with legal funds, making it more difficult to separate the two (Cassella, 2018). Other techniques in the integration phase include buying letters of credit, bonds, securities, banknotes, bills of lading, and guarantees. Through this step, illegal funds are returned to legitimate economic flows. After reaching this stage, actors are free to use funds in various ways [6]. Illegal funds that have gone through the process of money laundering can also be used to make legitimate investments.

2.5. Pressure and Money Laundering Intentions

Pressure provides motivation for cheating [11]. Pressures are categorized as financial pressures, vices, work-related pressures, and other pressures such as the desire to have more material like their wealthier counterparts [8]. Financial problems are a major factor driving money laundering [12]. Financial problems arise due to greed, business problems, failed investments, or personal financial problems. Work dissatisfaction, recognition of low performance, fear of losing work, and feeling underestimated are pressures to commit work-related fraud. The higher the pressure felt by the employee, the higher the intention of money laundering. Thus, the first hypothesis are formulated as follows:

H_1: Pressure has a positive influence on money laundering intentions

2.6. Opportunity and Money Laundering Intentions

Opportunity is a condition or situation that allows someone to do money laundering [13]. Opportunities to commit fraud, conceal and avoid punishment are the second important element in diamond fraud [8]. An ineffective internal control system provides an opportunity for money launderers. Failure to assess performance quality, failure to discipline fraud perpetrators, lack of access to information, lack of audit trails, and ignorance, apathy, or inability to detect fraud are also opportunities for money laundering.

Opportunities become higher when in the highest position in the company, as well as weak control or supervision [26]. This can influence company managers to get involved in money laundering. Thus, the second hypothesis are formulated as follows:

H_2: *Opportunity* has a positive influence on money laundering intentions

2.7. Supply Chain Finance, Money Laundering Intention

Supply chain finance can be understood as ‘financing the supply chain’. This may be akin to structured trade financing whereby financial institutions fund various stages of the trade transactions – from raw material sourcing to factory and production, to transport, to warehouse, to shipping, all the way up until the product reaches the buyer. Structuring trade financing means that financial institutions take care that they fund various stages while covering and mitigating their risks at each stage of the supply chain using various financing instruments. Thought it should be stressed that structured trade finance has been used for decades before the term ‘supply chain finance’ existed and long before it became mainstream, the advantage of discussing supply chain finance in this vein is that it facilitates a fuller appreciation of the different challenges that financing institutions face at each stage of the supply chain.

Supply chain finance helps the real economy because it facilitates the movement of goods both domestically and across borders. The paper provides illustrations on how supply chain financing is employed, and how it lubricates trade flows. Pressure provides motivation for fraud [11]. Opportunity is a condition or situation that allows someone to do money laundering [13]. Love of money causes someone to have the desire to be rich and have the view that

money is very important. However, human greed causes excessive love for money [27]. This excessive love of money has the potential to encourage individuals to make unethical decisions, including money laundering [15]. Thus, the higher the pressure, opportunity, plus a high love of money will increase the intention of money laundering. Thus, the third and fourth hypothesis are formulated as follows:

H_3: Pressure has a positive effect on money laundering intentions with love of money as a moderating variable

H_4: Opportunity has a positive effect on money laundering intentions with love of money as a moderating variable

3. Research Methodology

Various risks in the supply chain include performance risks (e.g., when the supplier delivers products with below par quality), credit risk (e.g., possible default of the borrower), warehousing risk (e.g., inventory losses, theft, fraud), transport risk (e.g., breakage, losses, accident). In addition, there are general risks affecting all stages of the supply chain such as political risk, price risk and other macroeconomic risks. Different risk mitigants also exist for each type of risk such as guarantees, fidelity insurance, credit risk insurance, transport insurance, and others. This research uses quantitative methods. The quantitative method is done by survey. The research method is used to answer two research questions. The purpose of this study is to identify possible types of money laundering that occur in the Indonesian banking sector, analyze the effect of pressure and opportunity on money laundering intentions, and identify moderating variables that have a strong or weak relationship with money laundering intentions. The subjects used in the study were the 30 largest banks in Indonesia. The thirty banks were chosen because they contributed 81.9% of the total national banking assets of 8.119 trillion. Data of 30 banks were taken in five provinces with the highest risk of money laundering which included the Provinces of DKI Jakarta, West Java, East Java, Riau and North Sumatra.

One research question that will be answered through a survey. The survey process was carried out in the span of 1 June to 30 September 2019. The dependent variable in this study included pressures and opportunities. The moderation variables developed in this study based on Theory of Planned Behavior are love of money, work environment and organizational culture. Furthermore, the independent variable used in this study is money laundering intention.

The sample used, which is 30 banks selected using convenience sampling. Convenience sampling is sampling based on the availability of elements and the ease of getting them. The sample used using the assumption of a bank with assets of 100 trillion has employees of 500 funding officers, then 81.9% of the total national assets or of 8,119 trillion is 330 thousand funding officers. Furthermore, determining the number of samples using Sloving's theory (1990) with the formula:

$$n = \frac{N}{(1 + (N + e^2)} \qquad n = \frac{33.000}{(1 + (33.000 + 5\%^2)}$$

Cronbach's alpha will be carried out for each construct to measure the reliability of internal consistency. One structured questionnaire will be developed and has eight (8) aspects of variables. Respondents will be asked to provide responses using the 1992 continuum continuum. The ranking scale starts from never or strongly disagree (3) to high or strongly agree (7) (Hari, 1940). Data will be analyzed using SPSS 21 to conduct factor analysis, hypothesis testing, correlation and regression.

The analysis steps that will be used are as follows:

1. Test validity and reliability. Validity test is done to determine whether the measuring instrument used is correct. The reliability test is used to determine that the instrument used can be trusted as a data collection tool and is able to reveal the real information. The validity test used in this study used the Pearson Corellation. Data is said to be valid if the value of sig. < 0.05. The reliability test was carried out with Cronbach Alpha and said to be reliable if the results of Cronbach Alpha > 0.06.
2. Before testing the hypothesis, a classic assumption test is performed so that the independent variable as an estimator of the dependent variable is unbiased. The classic assumption tests include:

a) Normality Test

Normality test is done to find out whether in the regression model, the independent variable and the dependent variable have a normal distribution or not. To avoid bias, the data used must be normally distributed. If the assumption is violated, then the statistical test becomes invalid (Ghozali, 2006). The normality test used in this study is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov One Sample Test.

b) Multicolinearities Test

Multicollinearity test was conducted to test whether there is a relationship between independent variables in the regression model (Ghozali 2006). Multicorrelation itself arises when the independent variables correlate with each other. A good regression model should not have a perfect correlation between the independent variables. The presence or absence of multicollinearity can be seen through the value of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). If the VIF value > 10, it can indicate the presence of multicollinearity.

c) Homogenity Test

Homogenity test aims to test whether there is an unequal variance from the residuals of an observation to another in a regression model (Ghozali, 2006). The hallmark of this test is to use the Glejser Test. If the significance value> 0.05, heteroscedasticity does not occur.

d) Autocorrelation Test

The autocorrelation test is used to test whether there is a correlation between the disturbance error in a period and the error of the previous period in the linear regression model. Autocorrelation usually occurs when the data processed is time series data. A good regression model is free from autocorrelation (Ghozali, 2006). The autocorrelation test used is Durbin-Watson with the provisions that if the value produced is between -2 to +2, it can be said that there is no autocorrelation.

3. The analysis carried out is by Multiple Linear Regression to see the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable.

4. Analysis and Discussion

4.1. Sample Characteristics

Supply chain finance has experienced rapid growth but for a wider adoption, attention should be directed to various regulatory issues that are hampering its development. The paper discussed these challenges. Initially, one of the major threat to the availability of trade and supply chain financing was the high capital cost imposed by Basel 3 regulations on all bank lending including trade financing. These regulations have been adjusted since on account of evidence of low default and loss rates of trade finance instruments. But potential challenges remain from possible regulatory arbitrage due to uneven implementation of Basel rules across economies. The population in this study is all banks in Indonesia. The sample used in this study is 30 banks as the largest contributor to state assets in Indonesia. Sample selection using convenience sampling techniques and the number of valid samples is 457.

4.2. Data Analysis

4.2.1. Validity Test

Validity test is done to determine whether the measuring instrument used is correct.

Table 1. Validity Test Result of Pressure Variable

Questions	Valid/Invalid	Questions	Valid/Invalid	Questions	Valid/Invalid
Question 1	Valid	Question 6	Valid	Question 11	Valid
Question 2	Valid	Question 7	Valid	Question 12	Valid
Question 3	Valid	Question 8	Valid	Question 13	Valid
Question 4	Valid	Question 9	Valid	Question 13	Valid
Question 5	Valid	Question 10	Valid	Question 15	Valid

Tabel 2. Validity Test Result of Opportunity

Questions	Valid/ Invalid	Questions	Valid/ Invalid	Questions	Valid/ Invalid	Questions	Valid/ Invalid	Questions	Valid/ Invalid
Question 1	Valid	Question 7	Valid	Question 13	Valid	Question 19	Valid	Question 25	Valid
Question 2	Valid	Question 8	Valid	Question 14	Valid	Question 20	Valid	Question 26	Valid
Question 3	Valid	Question 9	Valid	Question 15	Valid	Question 21	Valid	Question 27	Valid
Question 4	Valid	Question 10	Valid	Question 16	Valid	Question 22	Valid	Question 28	Valid
Question 5	Valid	Question 11	Valid	Question 17	Valid	Question 23	Valid	Question 29	Valid
Question 6	Valid	Question 12	Valid	Question 18	Valid	Question 24	Valid		

Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 are the results of the data validity test used in this study. Sign value. in the table is smaller than α 5%, so it can be said that the data used in this study are valid.

4.2.2. Reliability Test

The reliability test is used to determine that the instrument used can be trusted as a data collection tool and is able to reveal the real information.

Table 3. Reliability Test Result

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,765	5

Table 4.3 shows the results of the Cronbach alpha of 0.765. The data used are said to be reliable if the Cronbach alpha value <0.06. This means that the data used in this study are reliable.

4.2.3. Classic Assumption Test

The classic assumption test is performed to determine the condition of the data so that an appropriate analysis model is obtained for this study. The classic assumption tests include normality test, multicollinearity test, heteroscedasticity test, and autocorrelation test. Based on testing that has been done, no deviations have been found with the classical assumption test.

4.2.4. Normality Test

Normality test is performed to determine whether in the regression model, the independent variables and the dependent variable have a normal distribution.

Tabel 4: Normality Test Result

		Unstandardized Residual
N		457
Normal Parameters	Mean	,0000000
	Std. Deviation	8,53669905
Most Extreme Differences	Absolute	0,085
	Positive	0,069
	Negative	-0,085
	Test Statistic	0,085
	Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	0,000

Based on the normality test results table, it is known that the significance value obtained is greater than 0,000, which means that these variables are not normally distributed. Even so, the data can still be processed because behavioral variables cannot be normally distributed. The behavior of one another is not the same and cannot be predicted.

4.2.5. Multicollinearity Test

Multicollinearity test is done to test whether there is a relationship between the independent variables in the regression model.

Table 5. Multicollinearity Test Result

Model	Unstandardized Coefficient		Standardized Coefficient	t	Sig	Collinearity Statistics	
	B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1 Constant	38,064	8,399		4,530	,000		
Pressure	,199	,101	,125	1,971	,050	,404	2,472
Opportunity	-,237	,078	-,123	-3,031	,003	,987	1,013
Love of Money	,221	,093	,113	2,394	,017	,727	1,376
Work Environment	,033	,056	,030	,590	,556	,610	1,640
Organizational Culture	,208	,110	,091	1,890	,060	,694	1,440

The multicollinearity test results table shows a tolerance value greater than 0.1 and a VIF value smaller than 10. So, it can be said that the data does not indicate the presence of multicollinearity.

4.2.6. Homogenity Test

Homogenity test has the aim to test whether in the regression model there is an inequality of variance from the residuals of one observation to another.

Table 6. Homogenity Test Result

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	19,740	5,246		3,763	,000
Pressure	-,048	,063	-,062	-,755	,451
Opportunity	,031	,049	,034	,639	,524
Love of Money	,006	,058	,006	,098	,922
Work Environment	-,141	,035	-,272	-4,052	,187
Organizational Culture	,056	,069	,051	,808	,420

Based on table 4.6, it is known that the significance value of 0.451; 0.524; 0.922; 0.187; 0.420 where the result is greater than 0.05 which means there is no heterokedasticity to influence the pressure, opportunity, rationalization, capability, love of money, work environment, and corporate culture on the intention of money laundering.

4.2.7. Autocorrelation Test

The autocorrelation test is used to test whether there is a correlation between the disturbance error in a period and the error of the previous period in the linear regression model.

Table 7. Autocorrelation Test Result

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	0,696	0,485	0,474	8,630	1,959

Based on the autocorrelation test table, it is known that the Durbin-Watson value is 1.959 where the value is between -2 to +2, so it can be said that there is no autocorrelation.

4.2.8. Hypothesis Test

Based on the classic assumption test that has been done, it can be seen that the available data meet the requirements to use multiple regression models. Multiple linear regression is performed to see the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable.

4.3. Relationship between Pressure to Money Laundering Intentions

Table 8. Linier Regression Analysis Result of Hypothesis 1

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	39,550	4,024		9,828	0,000
Pressure	0,875	0,074	0,546	11,759	0,000

Based on the results of multiple linear regression analysis obtained regression coefficients for the pressure variable of 0.875 and t value of 11.759 with a significance of 0.000 where the value is below the significance level of 0.05. This means that the pressure has a positive effect on money laundering intentions. Thus it can be said that H_1 is supported.

This is consistent with the view that pressure provides motivation for money laundering [11]. Pressure is categorized as financial pressure, target pressure by superiors, vices, family economic pressure, and other pressures such as the desire to have more material like their wealthier counterparts [8]. Job dissatisfaction, recognition of low performance, fear of losing work, and feeling underestimated are pressures of money laundering. The higher the pressure felt by the employee, the higher the intention of money laundering.

4.4. Relationship between Opportunity to Money Laundering Intentions

Table 9. Linier Regression Analysis Result of Hypothesis 2

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T	Sig
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	112,487	9,044		12,437	0,000
Opportunity	-,306	,106	-,158	-2,889	0,004

Based on the results of multiple linear regression analysis obtained regression coefficients for the pressure variable of -0.306 and the calculated t value of -2.889 with a significance of 0.004. This indicates that opportunity has a negative effect on money laundering intentions. Thus it can be said that H1 is not supported. Opportunities to commit fraud, conceal and avoid punishment are the second important element in diamond fraud [8]. High opportunities do not necessarily make someone do money laundering.

Relationship between Pressure and Opportunity to Money Laundering Intentions with Love of Money as Moderating Variable

Table 10. Test of Hypothesis 3

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std Error of The Estimate
1	0,546	0,298	0,296	9,977

Table 11. Test of Hypothesis 3

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std Error of The Estimate
1	0,616	0,379	0,374	9,414

R Square in table 4.10 shows the value of 0.298 and in table 4.11 of 0.379. There was an increase in R Square of 0.081. This means that love of money strengthens the relationship between pressure and money laundering intentions. Thus it can be said that H_3 is supported.

Table 12. Test of Hypothesis 4

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std Error of The Estimate
1	0,158	0,025	0,022	11,762

Table 13. Test of Hypothesis 4

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std Error of The Estimate
1	0,478	0,228	0,221	10,496

R Square in table 4.12 shows the value of 0.022 and in table 4.13 of 0.228. There was an increase in R Square of 0.203. This means that love of money strengthens the relationship between opportunity and money laundering intentions. Thus it can be said that H_4 is supported.

Love of money causes someone to have the desire to be rich and have the view that money is very important. However, human greed causes excessive love for money [27]. This excessive love of money has the potential to encourage individuals to make unethical decisions, including taking money laundering actions.

5. Conclusion

The results showed that Supply chain finance influence the intention of money laundering. Someone who has high pressure and is faced with greediness or a love of excess money will have a high intention of money laundering. High opportunities with excessive love of money will also increase money laundering intentions. The theoretical implication of the results of this study is to provide evidence that if the pressure and opportunity associated with love of money can affect the intentions of money laundering. This research contributes to the development of behavioral research in testing the pressure, opportunity, and love of money. For organizations, this research contributes understanding to pay more attention to the mechanism of disclosure of disgrace. This can be done by implementing a system of disclosure of disgrace that works well, does not complicate the reporting process, protects the safety of whistleblowers, and does not impose sanctions on whistleblowers. Thus, with supply chain finance money laundring in the organization can be reduced.

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